Whether voters vote strategically, using their vote to best further their interests, or vote sincerely, voting for their rst choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We o er two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Second, we incorporate new operationalizations of the objective potential for strategic behavior than have been used in the past. We o er a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1023
October 1997 1 Introduction
Whether voters in democratic systems are rational" has long been under debate. One of the central points of contention has been whether the Riker and Ordeshook 1968 calculus of voting" is sound empirically e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994; Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993 . There, the voter is assumed to calculate the costs and bene ts of voting and to vote for the candidate bringing them the highest utility, if the utility of doing so outweighs the cost of voting.
When the calculus of voting" model was extended to multiparty elections by McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972, though, the theoretical rationale for another form of rational behavior became quite clear. For the McKelvey and Ordeshook model demonstrated that in a multiparty election, a voter might bewilling to vote for her second most preferred party if the more preferred party is unlikely to win and if there is a close contest between the second and third ranked parties. This rational behavior goes by many labels, called strategic, tactical, or sophisticated voting behavior we will refer to this behavior as strategic voting in this paper.
Obviously, this sort of strategic behavior by v oters was not noticed rst by McKelvey and Ordeshook. In fact, there is have been a number of theoretical developments of models of strategic voting behavior in single-member district plurality systems Cox 1994 Cox , 1997 Myerson and Weber 1993; Palfrey 1989 as well as in many other types of electoral systems Cox 1984; Dummett 1984; Gutowski and George 1993; Ho man 1982; Ludwin 1978; Myerson and Weber 1993 . But because of the obsession of much of the political behavior literature on modeling two party or two candidate elections in the United States, strategic behavior was largely ignored by most researchers until the late 1970's and early 1980's. Two political developments fueled the rising interest in strategic voting research. One was the rise of multi candidate presidential primary contests in the United States following the post 1968 reforms in the nomination processes in both of the major political parties. In some of these primary struggles, there were at least a half of a dozen candidates in each party primary; the fact that there were multiple viable candidates opened the door for strategic behavior by primary voters Abramson et al. 1992; Bartels 1985. The second development was the rise of third party or third candidate challengers in the United States and in the United Kingdom Cain 1978; Galbriath and Rae 1989; Heath et al. 1991; Johnston and Pattie 1991; Niemi et al. 1992 . In the United Kingdom, though, the sustained revival of the Liberal Party since 1970, the rise of nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland, and the new Social Democratic Party, poised signi cant c hallenges to the established two party system. The rising importance of these new or resurgent parties in British politics actually seemed to work to the advantage of the Conservatives in the early 1980's as Conservative opposition was split among several parties. This led to explicit attempts by political leaders, by the popular press, and by political pundits to persuade voters to cast strategic votes in order to defeat the Conservative party i n t h e 1987 general election Galbraith and Rae 1989. Thus, the 1987 British general election has become an important case study for scholars interested in the problem of strategic voting in multiparty elections.
In these two t ypes of political settings | multiparty elections in Britain and presidential primaries in the United States | many scholars have tried to estimate the amount of strategic behavior by v oters. As we report in Table 1 , there is a great deal of variation in the estimates of strategic behavior reported in the literature, ranging from a low of 5.1 reported by Johnston and Pattie 1991 for the 1983 British elections to a high of 17 reported by Niemi et al. 1992 for the 1987 British election. The estimates in the literature for the 1988 U.S. presidential primary are in the vicinity of 14. Table 1 goes here In this paper we develop a new approach for modeling strategic voting: we incorporate the variance in the likelihood of strategic voting across constituencies in a model of voter choice. This builds upon recent empirical work on modeling voter choice in multiparty democratic systems Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 1995 . As we argue below, our approach avoids many of the problems bedeviling past empirical work on strategic voting. In the end, using our new approach w e estimate that 7.2 of the electorate cast strategic ballots in the 1987 British election; this estimate is less than half of some of the methodologically troubled estimates which have been published in the literature. The structure of our paper is simple. We begin by examining the previous attempts to measure strategic voting. Next, we outline our model of strategic voting, and carefully distinguish between our approach the those in the existing literature. We then discuss our results, and conclude with a brief discussion focusing on the relevance of our work.
Strategic Voting and Past Studies
While there now seem to be political conditions in both the United States in the United Kingdom which give voters an incentive to behave strategically, the empirical literature has come up with very di erent estimates of the extent of strategic voting, even from researchers examining the same election in the same country. We believe that the reason for these divergent results lies in the di erent methodologies used in these studies to measure or to estimate the extent of strategic voting.
There have been three di erent approaches to measuring the extent of strategic voting used in the literature. The rst is the aggregated inference methodology. Essentially these researchers use aggregate election returns, in di erent ways, to discern the extent of strategic voting. Some researchers use aggregate electoral data to attempt a direct constituency by constituency estimate of strategic voting Cain 1978, while others look at shifts in vote shares between pairs of elections in di erent types of constituencies Spa ord 1972; Curtice and Steed 1988; Galbraith and Rae 1989; Johnston and Pattie 1991. Others have simply examined the support for minority parties in di erent political systems plurality versus proportional representation systems to infer the presence of strategic voting.
These studies all su er from an obvious and problematic aw. They all are using aggregated electoral data to infer individual level preferences and expectations about the probabilities of various parties winning elections. In broader terms, these researchers are testing individual level political theories with macro level electoral data | producing exactly the ecological inference" problem which has received much attention in the writing of prominent political methodologists in recent years e.g. Achen and Shively 1995; King 1997 . It is commonly known that estimates about individual behavior produced using aggregated data are often incorrect King 1997. Thus, we m ust be very suspicious of estimates of an individual level behavior like strategic voting produced using aggregate electoral data.
The second approach to measuring the extent of strategic voting is what we call the self reporting intentions methodology. In this widely used approach, researchers rely upon the reports of survey respondents about the motivations for their voting behavior Heath et al. 1991; Niemi et al. 1992; Evans and Heath 1993 . For example, in the 1987 British general election survey, respondents were asked to provide the main reason for supporting a particular party at the polls | one of the three response options often used to indicate strategic behavior was I really preferred another Party but it had no chance of winning in this constituency."
This type of survey question, in particular those in the 1987 British survey data, have been used quite widely in the literature on strategic voting. In fact, Niemi et al. 1992 use this survey question, and a subsequent open ended question asking for the reasons a respondent cast the ballot they reported, to develop three di erent measures of strategic voting. Unfortunately researchers using these survey questions do not appear to have seriously considered the quality of the survey responses obtained for questions asking for justi cations of reported political behavior. In fact, there has been a serious debate in the American electoral behavior literature recently about the quality of post election questions probing the respondent's vote Wright 1990 Wright , 1992 ; this work has found that there is a strong bias towards reporting a vote for winning candidates the further the interview is from the election.
In Figure 1 
Figure 1 Goes Here
It is quite clear that there is a postelection bias in favor of nding increased levels of strategic voting the further the interview is conducted from election day. This effect is particularly strong in the open ended method of measurement, since we see clear increases in each successive postelection month in the reported percentage of strategic voting. Of those respondents who were interviewed six months following the 1987 election, the open ended approach of survey based measurement of strategic voting would assert that they were over twice as likely as respondents interviewed one month after the election to report strategic voting. This strong positive bias in the extent of reported strategic voting using the open ended survey measurement approach also clearly biases the combined" measures which use information from both the open and closed ended measures of strategic voting. We even nd that there is a small positive bias in estimated strategic behavior the further the interview was conducted from the election when we look at the closed ended measure.
The percentages and the positive slopes of the three lines in Figure 1 demonstrate that relying on the self reports of respondents to measure the incidence of strategic voting is problematic, and is likely to produce overstated estimates of the proportions of the electorate who are voting strategically. For many of these self reports are not really strategic voting, but misreporting of vote biased towards the winner|which is observationally equivalent to reporting a strategic vote. Thus we believe that these artifacts of the survey design that the survey was conducted for such a long period after election day and that the quality of the answers to these questions about strategic behavior deteriorate following the election provide strong evidence against the use of these survey questions for the measurement of strategic behavior.
The third approach to measuring the extent of strategic voting in the literature is the closest to the theoretical models of strategic behavior in multiparty democracy. This approach tries to model strategic voting directly as the objective di erences between the stated vote and the preference rankings of individuals Black 1978; Cain 1978 or the subjective di erences between the vote cast and a rank ordering of parties or candidates Abramson et al. 1992; Bartels 1988; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Brady and Johnson 1987. This approach involves obtaining measures of the expected vote shares of each party or candidate and the true rank orderings of parties or candidates for each voter, so we call this the direct measurement methodology.
We believe that this approach is the one most likely to produce unbiased estimates of the extent of strategic voting in multiparty democracies. However, we are not convinced that the literature has yet advanced an appropriate way to measure the true rank orderings for parties or candidates for voters. The usual approach in the literature is to rely upon feeling thermometer rankings to produce rank orderings of parties or candidates for voters. The implicit assumption here is that responses to feeling thermometer questions elicit sincere preferences, an assumption which seems dubious at best. 1 We nd that there is no reason to believe that feeling thermometer questions are adequate measures of sincere preferences; no strong justi cation for this assumption has appeared in the literature. So we advance a di erent approach for studying the extent of strategic voting in the next section of this paper.
A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting
Our new approach for modeling strategic voting follows the general approach of the third aspect of the literature we just discussed, but with two important innovations. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. We use a methodological technique multinomial probit which allows us to examine the full choice set available to voters while explicitly allowing voters to see some parties as close substitutes thus avoiding imposing the restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumption on voters in this application. Second, we use a new operationalization of the objective strategic setting. We take advantage of the electoral structure of British elections that allows for cross constituency variance in the likelihood of strategic voting. In this section of the paper we discuss both these innovations and then conclude by discussing the speci c expectations we have of our model's predictions.
Our model of sincere voting is based heavily upon recent work on modeling multiparty elections using individual level survey data Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 1995; Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1997 . There are two important dimensions of this work which are relevant for our study of strategic voting. The rst dimension is that this approach utilizes a well speci ed model of voter decisionmaking. The data we are analyzing comes from the 1987 British General Election and we o er a model of voter decisionmaking which allows for retrospective economic, issue based prospective, and class based voting behavior Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1997. Thus our model of sincere voting provides a vehicle for us to control for all of the important perspectives on British electoral behavior simultaneously; this allows us to test for strategic voting without worrying about competing e ects.
We view the voters' utility for each party to be a function of the voter's position on the issues relative to the party and of characteristics of the voter which we describe below. The inclusion of issue variables in our models stems from the growing realization that issues matter" in British elections, just as they matter" in the electoral politics of many industrial democracies Inglehart 1977. This stems also from the realization that the e ect of class in British elections has slipped considerably Crewe 1974; Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt 1977; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983 . Working from the framework of the spatial model of elections, we include variables for the distance between the voter and each party on defense, government emphasis on in ation versus unemployment, taxes, redistribution of income, nationalization of industry, crime, and social welfare programs. The parties' position on each issue is taken to be the mean of the party placement on the 11 point issue scale by all respondents. We use the absolute value of the di erence between respondents' position and the party's position as a measure of issue distance on each item. 2 Hand in hand with the realization that issues are replacing class in framing voter decisions in British elections is a growing realization of the e ects of voter perceptions of the economy. This has occupied much of the empirical work on British elections Alt 1979; Lewis Beck 1988; Studlar, McAllister and Ascui 1990 . Accordingly, we include in our models variables for the respondent's perceptions of recent changes in in ation, unemployment, and taxation levels McAllister and Studlar 1992 . This allows a test of the retrospective voting model in a three party setting.
We also include demographic measures of the respondents. To allow for the possibility that class did matter in the 1987 election, we also include a n umber of control variables. First, we have an indicator of the voters' class a liation: whether the voter occupied a blue collar occupation or not. 3 Union membership has long been considered a staple of Labour support, but it is possible that this source of support has diminished considerably with the dismantling of the trade union movement during the rst two Thatcher administrations. We include a dummy variable for trade union members to examine the e ect of union membership on voter choice. As a third control for the e ects of class, we have a dummy variable which measures whether or not the voter was a public sector employee. 4 Demographic variables other than class have loomed large in research on British elections. The regional divisions in recent British elections have spurred a urry of works on regional in uences on voting, even though the growing North South political cleavage in British voting may be more of an artifact of economic divisions than anything speci c to certain regions Crewe 1992; McAllister and Studlar 1992. We include regional dummy v ariables in our models to test these assertions. With the massive sales of council houses during the Thatcher years, no doubt motivated to appeal to the moderately well o working classes, it is asserted that home ownership played some role in Thatcher's success in Crewe 1992 . Accordingly, we have a dummy variable in the model for home ownership. We also include measures of the respondent's age, sex, income, and education.
Importantly, our approach to studying multiparty electoral behavior is fundamentally di erent from the previous studies. Here, we begin with a random utility framework for studying voter behavior in multiparty elections which allows us to examine the full choice set of parties available to voters in any particular election. Any model of voter choice should allow voters to consider simultaneously all three parties. It should allow voters to weigh the parties' positions on the issues, to consider the parties' performance on the economy, and it should allow voters of di erent demographic traits to have di erent preferences for di erent parties. So, our framework does not impose the restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. We estimate the model using multinomial probit. 5 We follow the Alvarez Nagler Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998 implementation of multinomial probit which assumes that the respondent's utility is a function of choice speci c and individual speci c characteristics: In particular, the multinomial probit technique is well suited for the study of recent British elections. Since 1945, there have been three viable national parties in British politics, but it was not until the dual elections of 1974 that the Liberal party, in this period the electorally weakest party, began obtaining roughly 20 of the national vote. And in 1983, with the Liberal Social Democratic Alliance Alliance obtaining 25.4 of the national vote, just two percent lower than the Labour party, it looked as if British voters may h a ve nally had a real" third alternative. Thus, the emergence of the Alliance as an option o ered British voters in 1983 and 1987 three choices.
Yet British voters presumably do not view these three choices as truly distinct alternatives. Common wisdom holds that the Alliance is a substitute for Labour, or at least closer to Labour than to the Conservative party. However, even with this common wisdom, few empirical papers consider the possibility of the grouping of choices nor the possible violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption for example, see McAllister and Studlar 1992 or Stewart and Clarke 1992 on the 1987 British election. The multinomial probit model we use is useful precisely because it allows us to both test for the violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, and if independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated, the model will also provide us insight i n to the structure of the choice process. Is the Alliance considered by v oters as a substitute for Labour? Is the Alliance seen by v oters a s a c hoice more similar to Labour than to the Conservative party? What would happen if the Alliance dissolved? The multinomial probit model allows us to answer precisely these questions. 7 The multinomial probit model we use, then, provides the best model of strategic voting which we can operationalize, specify and estimate. The next step in our analysis of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election involves operationalization of the strategic situation facing individual voters in their own constituencies. The operative hypothesis is that people vote strategically: that they cast a vote for candidates or parties they think`can win', rather than`waste' their vote. Fortunately, British elections provide a fertile ground to test the theory; since voters participate in single member constituencies, we have signi cant variance across constituencies as to the likelihood of a vote for a given party being wasted. We are able to examine the behavior of voters who ought to have similar preferences for a given party being elected assuming those preferences are based on the attributes of individuals we measure, but we are able to observe those voters in two di erent sorts of constituencies: constituencies where Labour h a s a c hance of winning the constituencies and constituencies where Labour has no chance of winning. In these latter sorts of constituencies voters preferring Labour might want to consider voting strategically. This structure of the electoral system allows for a test of the strategic voting hypothesis.
We want to allow voters to cast their vote in a way likely to maximize the utility of their vote; which may not necessarily mean voting for the candidate they would most like to see win. Consider a voter whose rst choice is Labour L and who's complete preference ordering is: L A C . If this voter were to behave strategically, then the voter would beunlikely to vote for his her rst choice L if: Labour were sure to lose the constituency, and the voter's vote could help A to defeat C. In such a constituency, First, Labour would have to be too far behind in the race to have any reasonable chance of winning. Second, the race between the Conservatives and Alliance would have to be close. If both Labour and Alliance were going to be trounced by the Conservatives, and provided the voter was going to vote at all, then there would be no bene t to casting a strategic vote for Alliance rather than a sincere vote for Labour.
We can measure both of these concepts. The rst is given by:
M1 iL = jM a x CON; ALL , LABOURj 3 where C O N , ALL, and LABOUR denote the expected vote shares of the Conservative, Alliance, and Labour parties, respectively; and M a x CON; ALL denotes the maximum of C O Nand ALL i.e., the party running second. 8 This gives the amount that Labour is`out of it'. We expect that the larger the value of M1 L , the more likely that a vote for Labour would bewasted, and the less likely a voter is to cast such a vote.
The second concept is given by:
The closer the race between Conservative and Alliance, the larger the value of M2 iL . And the larger the value of M2 iL , the costlier it would be to waste a vote by v oting for Labour, and the more likely that the voter should act strategically and vote either Conservative or Alliance. However, note that the impact of this variable ought t o b e c o n tingent upon the value of M1 iL . For instance, in a three way tie the value of M2 iL would approach in nity; yet there would be zero reason to vote strategically because a vote for Labour is called for. Hence M2 iL should enter the model multiplied by M1 iL . We include M2 iL by itself, as well as multiplied by M1 iL , so that we can correctly interpret the coe cients.
We construct similar measures for the Alliance and the Conservative party.
Thus, our approach to modeling strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election is relatively simple. We add our two measures of the potential for strategic behavior for each party, in each constituency, and estimate these parameters for each party controlling for all of the other potential in uences on voter decisionmaking. Thus, for each party, we estimate: where L, C, A index Labour, Conservative and Alliance, respectively. X iJ measures issue distances between the party and voter, A measure attitudes and characteristics speci c to the voter. Of critical interest for the purposes of this paper, though, are the coe cients on the strategic voting terms. By the logic of the operationalization of these measures we expect that if strategic voting occurs, then: 1 0, 2 0, and 3 0.
Empirical Evidence for Strategic Voting in the 1987
British Election
In Table 1 we present the full multinomial probit results from the estimation of this model. The results we obtain here are very similar to those presented in previous work on this same election, so we will refer interested readers to that research Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1997. All we wish to note here is that most of the variables are signed in theoretically expected manners, many are statistically signi cant, and this model correctly classi es 71 of the reported votes cast by the 2080 voters in our sample. Table 1 Goes Here
The important coe cients to focus on for our purposes are those on the three strategic voting variables. In the previous section we had argued that we expected each of these three coe cients to be negatively signed. We nd that two of the three coe cients those on M1 and the M1 M2 i n teraction are negative and statistically signi cant, although the interaction term is signi cant at the looser p = :10 level. The M2 coe cient, though, is positive and is also signi cant at the p = :10 level.
The marginal e ects of each of the objective strategic voting variables are: Thus, the partial e ects of M1 are always negative, as predicted by our earlier discussion this is true since M2 is always positive. The further behind Labour is expected to run in a constituency, the less likely a voter is to cast a vote for Labour. This is strategic voting. However, the partial e ects of M2 are negative only when M1 : 125 i.e., only when the third party is su ciently far behind. This applies to 46 of constituencies for the Labour party, 46 of constituencies for the Alliance, and 7 of constituencies for the Conservative party. In our sample of respondents, how close the top two parties are expected to bein the constituency a ects the respondents' probability of voting for Labour and Alliance in the predicted manner in 46 and 43 of cases, respectively. In the other cases, given how competitive Labour and Alliance are in the constituency|the closeness of the other two parties does not persuade the respondent to abandon Labour or Alliance and vote strategically for one of the other two parties. For only 7 of our respondents is the Conservative party expected to be so far behind the other two parties that the closeness of the other two parties prompts a strategic vote by a Conservative supporter.
However, what of the important substantive question | what is the estimated extent of strategic voting in this particular election? Was it as high as the 17 reported by Niemi and associates 1992 or was as low as the 6 reported by others Evans and Heath 1993; Johnston and Pattie 1991? Obviously, dramatic di erences like these in estimates of the extent of strategic voting lead to di erent interpretations of British politics, of this speci c model of strategic voter behavior, and even of the general rational choice approach for studying politics.
We report our estimates of the extent of strategic voting in Table 2 . There we have classi ed each of the voters in our survey sample in two di erent ways. The rst classi cation scheme is given by the rows of the table. To compute the row e n tries we used the model reported in Table 1 , but hypothesized that all voters were in constituencies where the three parties had equal chances of winning i.e., each party had a vote share of 33 1 3 in the 1983 election in the constituency. We set variables M1 and M2 to zero, and used the estimated coe cients from Table 1 to compute the utility of each party for each voter. We then assign the voter's choice to the party they have the highest utility; this gives us each voter's sincere vote. Then, using the full model presented above, including the strategic voting variables, we predict each voter's strategic votes for the parties; these are presented in the columns of Table 2 . Table 2 Goes Here
The entries along the main diagonal of the table give the numbers and percentages of voters in our sample whose predicted sincere and strategic votes are the same. The o diagonal voters are those who are strategic voters, since we predict that these voters change from their sincere vote due to the objective probabilities of each party's victory in the constituency. Adding the o -diagonal elements in Table 2 , we see that there are 149 strategic voters in our sample, or 7.2 of the electorate. This number is in line with some of the estimates o ered in the literature Evans and Heath 1993; Johnston and Pattie 1991 . But our estimate suggests that those who have used subjective recall questions to estimate strategic voting e.g. Niemi et al. 1992 appear to have dramatically over estimated the proportions of strategic voters, possibly due to the over reporting problem we discussed earlier. Table 2 reveals how those 149 strategic votes were distributed. Under sincere voting, we predict a 33.5 vote-share for Labour. However, we estimate 54 7.8 of those voters to have v oted strategically for Alliance, and 3 of them to have v oted strategically for the Conservative party. But Alliance is the biggest victim of strategic voting. We predict Alliance would have gotten an 18.7 share of the vote under sincere voting. However, with strategic voting we estimate a 17.6 share. Of those we expect to defect strategically from Alliance, we estimate that they split almost evenly between the Conservative and Labour parties 10.5 and 10.8, respectively. The Conservative party is the overall bene ciary of strategic voting: their estimated sincere vote share is 47.8; while their estimated strategic share is 49.5.
These results match the intuition of the`wasted vote.' If voters do not want to waste their vote on a party with a poorchance of winning the contested seat, then the parties with the lowest expectations of winning a seat will be hurt. Also, the`wasted vote' phenomenon in the 1987 British election harmed the party the least likely to win a signi cant share of constituencies | the Alliance. Therefore the net impact of strategic behavior in this election was for the Conservatives to pick up almost two full percentage points of national vote share; both Labour and Alliance lose vote share as a result of strategic behavior, with Alliance losing the most.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have made three important arguments in this paper. First, we have argued that past approaches for the measurement of strategic voting have largely been awed. From analyses that use ecological inference to those using self reporting of strategic behavior, we have argued that these approaches are likely to produce incorrect measures of the likelihood of strategic behavior. In particular, using reported strategic voting to measure strategic voting is a dangerous proposition because such self reports are contaminated by a tendency to overreport voting for the winner, a tendency exacerbated by self reports collected further away from the election. Since self reports for the winner when the voter's preference may h a ve been for another candidate are observationally equivalent t o strategic voting, measurement using such self reports will overstate the degree of strategic voting. We think Figure 1 demonstrates the problem quite clearly.
Second, it is possible to take advantage of the electoral structure of British politics to test for strategic voting. The British case o ers variance across constituencies in the expected amount of strategic voting. By utilizing this information, a well speci ed model of voter preferences, and a exible estimation technique multinomial probit, we can better measure the extent of strategic voting. We believe that the combination of an objective measure of the likelihood of strategic voting and our multinomial probit model of voter choice is the best approach for modeling strategic voting behavior in multiparty democracies.
Last, using our new approach, we nd the amount of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election is on the low end of the range of previously reported estimates; with some previous estimates being in ated by at least a factor of two. There has been considerable variation in the estimated extent of strategic voting in this particular election, with estimates ranging from roughly 6-7 Evans and Heath 1993 ; Heath et al. 1991 ; Johnston and Pattie 1991 , to a slightly higher range of 10-12 Galbraith and Rae 1989, to as high as 17 Niemi et al. 1993 . Our estimate is an important substantive nding, since it veri es that some strategic behavior occurred in this particular British election | but only a slight amount of strategic behavior.
This leaves open the question of whether voters generally do or do not behave as strategic models of politics predict. Our results here indicate that a small subset of the electorate did behave strategically in this one election. The truth is out there; but to determine if such strategic behavior is a general phenomenon, we will have to examine other British elections and elections in other democratic multiparty nations. Only then well we be in a position to know how much strategic behavior occurs in multiparty elections, and what institutional features of di erent political systems play a role in either mitigating or enhancing the likelihood that voters behave strategically. Notes 1 This assumption seems to run counter to one of the most common uses for feeling thermometers in the electoral studies literature | a measure of party or candidate preferences, and ultimately, voting behavior e.g., Kelley and Mirer 1974. Feeling thermometers, especially those for political parties, have also been used to measure partisan a liation, which also seems quite at odds with the use of these survey questions as measures of sincere voting preferences if partisanship is conceptually distinct from voting behavior e.g., Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980 . Given that researchers uses these survey questions to measure such diverse concepts clearly calls into question what feeling thermometer questions really measure. This is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but it does lead us to be wary of analyses of strategic voting based on feeling thermometers.
2 By using the distance from the respondents' self placement to the mean placement o f each party|rather than the distance from the respondents' self placement to the respondents' placement of the party|we avoid contaminating our measure with the tendency of respondents to project their favored candidates closer to their own ideal issue position. Abramson et al. 1992 1988 US S.T. Dem. 13 Abramson et al. 1992 1988 US S.T. Rep. 12.7-13.9 Cain 1978 1970 UK 14.6 Niemi et al. 1993 1987 UK 17.0 Month After Election
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